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“Quantal” behavior in classical probability
K. A. Kirkpatrick∗
New Mexico Highlands University, Las Vegas, New Mexico 87701
A number of phenomena generally believed characteristic of quantum mechanics and seen as inter-
pretively problematic—the incompatibility and value-indeterminacy of variables, the non-existence
of dispersion-free states, the failure of the standard marginal-probability formula, the failure of the
distributive law of disjunction and interference—are exemplified in an emphatically non-quantal
system: a deck of playing cards. Thus the appearance, in quantum mechanics, of incompatibility
and these associated phenomena requires neither explanation nor interpretation.
1. INTRODUCTION
I will show you a probabilistic system which exhibits these phenomena:
Q1. Observations of the several variables of the system cannot be made simultaneously—
the processes for their observation are mutually inconsistent.
Q2. Variables are incompatible: The statistics of the observation of two different variables
in succession depend on the order of their observation; joint probability distributions
of such incompatible variables do not exist.
Q3. The system has no dispersion-free states—if, in a particular preparation of the system,
one variable is sharp, the variable(s) incompatible with it cannot be.
Q4. An observation whose result is ignored may affect the statistics of a succeeding, in-
compatible, observation—an apparent contradiction of the formula for marginal prob-
abilities.
Q5. Under certain circumstances, a disjunction of several values of a variable may fail
to distribute through the conjunction with a succeeding, incompatible, observation—
interference may occur.
Would you not assume any system such as this to be a quantum-mechanical one? Such
an assumption would be most reasonable: each phenomenon on this list has been consid-
ered, by one author or another, to be characteristic of quantum mechanics; each has been
considered inexplicable by (and unacceptable from the viewpoint of) classical physics; each
has inspired interpretations of quantum mechanics (Copenhagenism, quantum probability,
quantum logic, . . . ; for an excellent review, see Ref. 1). But that assumption, however rea-
sonable, would be incorrect—the system is unarguably classical, consisting of playing cards
being drawn from a deck under an unusual, but straightforward, scheme.1
I will argue, in Sec. 7, that the existence of such an example invalidates every call for
the interpretation of quantum mechanics, every claim of metaphysical difficulty regarding
quantum mechanics, which is based on the statistical phenomena Q2–Q5 . If a problem
of meaning or understanding were raised by these phenomena, it would not be a problem
for the understanding of quantum mechanics per se but a problem for the understanding
of the category probabilistic models of sequences of variable-evaluation events in systems
having several variables—one such system being quantum mechanics, and another being
our example.
∗E-mail: kirkpatrick@physics.nmhu.edu
1 The cards are selected using ordinary (chaotic) mechanical shuffling; the resulting system is determin-
istic (although probabilistic) and completely describable by classical mechanics—as far from quantum
mechanical as is possible for a physical system to be.
2 “Quantal” behavior in classical probability
In Sec. 2, I present the general probabilistic concepts and some necessary notation. In
Sec. 3, I give formal definitions of Q2–Q5 (Eqs. (4), (7), (9), and (10), respectively), and
prove that Eq. (4), the definition of compatibility, is equivalent to the quantum-mechanical
definition in terms of commuting operators. In Sec. 4, I present examples of a classical
probabilistic system which exhibits each of the properties Q1–Q5; the statistical properties
of these systems are summarized in Eq. (11) and the discussion following. In Sec. 5, I clarify
how Q4 and Q5 may occur (both in classical probability and in quantum mechanics) with-
out violating basic probability identities: I deal with the problem of the completeness of
the values of variables in the derivation of the marginal-probability formula by introducing
the concept of manifestation, and then use this to solve a problem (noted by Margenau(2))
in which the marginal-probability formula seems to fail in quantum mechanics. In Sec. 6,
I discuss the matter of value-indeterminate variables, called “nonreality” in quantum me-
chanics, and show that it is a natural occurrence in nondeterministic (as contrasted with
simply chaotically probabilistic) systems. I provide several appendices: Appendix A gives
a brief summary of the probability of propositions, Appendix B contains the mathematical
analysis of the example system, and Appendix C contains several exercises which illustrate
Q1, Q2, and Q4 in a very simple system.
2. THE GENERAL SETTING; NOTATION
In this section I discuss the theory of sequences of events in a probabilistic system de-
scribed by more than one variable. This does not require an extension of standard probability
theory (which is summarized in Appendix A)—merely, to avoid ambiguities, the introduc-
tion of several new terms and some notation (which are new only because textbooks do not
consider systems of several independent variables).
The system. A probabilistic system having several variables, P , Q, . . . , whose possible
values are discrete: { p1, p2, . . . }, { q1, q2, . . . }, . . . . The values of each variable are disjoint
and complete (cf. Appendix A). (If it doesn’t lead to ambiguity, the proposition that a
variable has a particular value will be abbreviated to the value itself: P = pj will be written
simply pj.)
Manifested events. An event is an occurrence at which at least one variable of the system
takes on a value randomly; this is brought about by a physical interaction of the system with
its exterior. Which variable takes on a value randomly depends on the details of the physical
interaction, or manifestation; at each event, then, a particular variable is manifested. The
dynamics of a probabilistic system deals with a (time) sequence of events.2
The v-state. An event is described by the values which have occurred; I will call this
description the value state (the “v-state”); the theory of the system yields probabilities for
the various branches, or v-states, possible for the event.
Preparation and the p-state. A preparation is an event process which erases any effect
of the system’s prior history on the probabilities of succeeding events. A preparation of a
system determines the system’s probability- or preparation-state (the “p-state”), a function
which allows the calculation of probabilities of every possible succeeding sequence of events.
The p-state is to be distinguished from the “state” of classical physics (to which, in a sense,
the v-state corresponds); it does not describe what is, but only the probabilities of what
might be. Because different preparations may result in the same p-state, a p-state is implied
by, but does not specify, a preparation. In quantum mechanics, the p-state is equivalent
with the statistical operator of the system. Thus
Preparation ⇒ p-state
QM
⇐⇒ statistical operator. (1)
2 Both quantum mechanics and my card system are probability theories of sequences of events; neither can
be treated as a probability theory of values, because in neither can the set of all value propositions be
given a Boolean logical structure.
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Though the p-state is determined by the preparation, it may then change according to a de-
terministic dynamics (the Schro¨dinger equation, for example); it does not, however, change
according to the outcomes of events (occurrences). We will write probability expressions
with the p-state (say s) as a subscript: Prs
(
·
)
.
Event sequence notation. An event’s ordinal position in a sequence of events will be
denoted by a superscript in brackets: The event E followed by the event F is denoted E[1]∧
F [2]. Because this notation is rather awkward, we introduce the following simplifications
which will allow us to avoid the use of explicit ordinal superscripts for the most part:
(a) When the terms in the probability expressions are in the “natural” order and no ambi-
guity arises, the sequence ordinals will be dropped; thus Prs
(
pj
)
always means Prs[0]
(
p
[1]
j
)
,
and Prs
(
qk
∣∣ pj ) always means Prs[0]( q[2]k ∣∣ p[1]j ).
(b) In probability expressions involving a conjunction such as Prs[0]
(
x[1] ∧ y[2]
)
, we intro-
duce the symbol &, “and then,” which implies the sequential order of conjunction:
x& y ≡ x
[1] ∧ y[2]. (2)
Then Prs
(
x& y
)
always means Prs[0]
(
x[1] ∧ y[2]
)
.
(c) All other orders of occurrence in probability expressions will require the explicit use of
the ordinal superscripts—e.g., “retrodiction,” Prs[0]
(
x[1]
∣∣ y[2] ).
Filtered preparation. The conditional probability Prs
(
·
∣∣ x ) refers to the probability
distribution of the subset of the preparations which in the succeeding event satisfied the
proposition X = x; this distribution is the same as the distribution of a preparation con-
sisting of s followed by the filter which passes only that subset X = x:
Prs
(
·
∣∣ x ) = Prs& x( · ). (3)
“Observation.” Throughout this paper I will use the term “observation” for its simplic-
ity and familiarity. But it is too easy to infer from the use of this term the existence of
an observer, which connotes human conscious involvement and a concomitant collection of
metaphysical difficulties. As a physicist, not a metaphysicist, I always mean by “observa-
tion” only the minimal physical interactions necessary to assure the occurrence of an event;
presumably, a sufficiently clever human would then be able to observe the value manifested
in that event. Further, in probabilistic systems, that which is “observed” is in most cases
(think of flipping a coin, drawing a card, passing a spin system through a Stern-Gerlach
device) given its value by the very process of “observation” (thus the scare-quotes, which,
the point having been made, I henceforth drop).
3. COMPATIBILITY AND INTERFERENCE
3.1. Compatibility; Q2
Here is a formal definition of compatibility (informally stated in Q2; recall the notation
introduced in Eq. (2)):
Definition. The two variables P and Q are compatible iff
Prs
(
pj & qk
)
= Prs
(
qk& pj
)
(4)
for all indices, for every preparation state s.3
3 Incompatibility does not arise in elementary probability texts, in which the usual elementary examples
of sequences are the drawing of balls from a urn or cards from a deck, almost always done either with
replacement or without replacement; in either case the probability is independent of the order of occur-
rence. However, there are many other replacement schemes (e.g., “replace if red, discard if green”) which
do not lead to this symmetry.
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The use of the quantum-mechanical term compatibility for this classical definition is not
arbitrary: The following theorem establishes that this definition is equivalent with quantum
mechanics’ commuting-operators definition.
Theorem. Two variables P and Q of a quantum system are compatible, Prs
(
pj & qk
)
=
Prs
(
qk & pj
)
for all j, k, and s iff their corresponding operators P and Q satisfy PQ = QP.
Proof: Expressing Eq. (4), the compatibility of the variables P and Q, in quantal terms
(utilizing the usual “sandwich” form for the probability of successive events, with the propo-
sition R = rj being represented by the 1-projector P[ rj ] ≡ | rj 〉〈 rj |), we have
Tr
{
ρ P[ pj ]P[ qk ]P[ pj ]
}
= Tr
{
ρP[ qk ]P[ pj ]P[ qk ]
}
. (5)
Eq. (4) holds for all p-states s, hence Eq. (5) must hold for all statistical operators ρ, so
P[ pj ]P[ qk ]P[ pj ] = P[ qk ]P[ pj ]P[ qk ]. (6)
Introduce(3) the operator C ≡ P[ pj ]P[ qk ] − P[ qk ]P[ pj ]. By Eq. (6), C
†C is the zero
operator, hence ||C|x 〉||2 = 0 for all |x 〉, hence C is the zero operator, i.e., P[ pj ] and P[ qk ]
commute; by Eq. (5), this implies the compatibility of P and Q, completing the implicative
circle: the compatibility of the variables P and Q is equivalent with the commutativity of
the basis projectors P[ pj ] and P[ qk ].
The variables P and Q are represented by the hermitian operators P and Q, whose
eigenexpansions are P =
∑
t ptP[ pt ] and Q =
∑
t qtP[ qt ], respectively. As is well-known,
the commutativity of P[ pj ] and P[ qk ] is equivalent with the commutativity of P and Q,
which is thus equivalent with the compatibility of P and Q. 
3.2. Sharpness; Q3
A variable is said to be sharp in a given event if it has no statistical dispersion; in
probability terms, Prs
(
pj
)
∈ { 0, 1 }. The condition Q3 is expressed by
Prs
(
qk
∣∣ pj ) 6= 1 (7)
(i.e., if a system has been filtered to a sharp value of P , then a succeeding observation of
an incompatible variable Q cannot yield a sharp value).
3.3. Marginal probability; Q4
In the case of the sequences { pj & q }
(
i.e.,
{
pj
[1] ∧ q[2]
})
, the formula of marginal prob-
ability (cf. Appendix A) would seem to imply∑
t
Prs
(
pt& q
)
= Prs[0]
(
q[2]
)
. (8)
This expresses the erroneous assumption (based on the completeness of the values of a
variable) that Prs
( (∨
j pj
)
& q
)
= Prs
(
T& q
)
is independent of the variable P whose
values are disjoined (or summed over)—that is, that Prs[0]
(
q[2]
)
itself is defined. This is
generally not the case (and is Q4 on the list of “quantal” phenomena). We will discuss this
further in Sec. 5, where we develop the correct form of the formula for marginal probability
of a sequence, Eq. (16).
This error, moreover, is often compounded by ignoring the sequential index, writing∑
t
Prs
(
pt& q
)
= Prs
(
q
)
. (9)
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This seems to imply that Prs[0]
(
q[2]
)
= Prs[0]
(
q[1]
)
); this is generally incorrect, even when
Prs[0]
(
q[2]
)
is defined. Although the error is rather obvious, it is exactly the error made by
Margenau which led to his questioning the use of classical probability in quantum mechanics;
we discuss this further in Sec. 5.5.
3.4. Interference; Q5
In physical examples of classical wave systems (optics, acoustics, ocean waves, . . . ), the
energy is additive for independent waves. As we analyze a wave process, we may arbitrarily
divide it into several alternate disjoint wave subprocesses, all having a common endpoint.
Interference is the difference (or, qualitatively, the existence of a difference) between the
value of the energy at the endpoint of the process and the sum of the values of the energies
of each of the several parallel subprocesses at that endpoint. (If this difference is made
a function of the endpoint, we refer to an interference pattern.) Interference is not itself
a directly observable phenomenon; rather, it is an artifact of the analysis of the physical
system, and is defined only in relation to the particular analytical decomposition. For
example, in the double-slit apparatus there is interference between the left and right slits,
but there is no interference between the upper halves of the two slits and their lower halves—
though the resulting pattern on the screen is the same in either case.
But classical wave interference is not directly applicable to quantum mechanics (nor to
any probabilistic system): theories of probabilistic systems predict the probabilities of the
occurrence of a value of a variable, not the value itself, so the energy can’t be used in
the definition. Of course, there are quantum systems so similar to the classical cases,
both physically and mathematically (e.g., the atomic Young apparatus) that the idea of
interference transferred rather directly, without formal definition; however, for many other
situations (e.g., Wigner’s recombining Stern-Gerlach apparatus), the analogy is much less
direct. Though it seems we all “know it when we see it,” still there is need for an explicit
definition of a generalization of interference to probabilistic systems, one expressed in terms
not restricted to the quantum formalism.
The probability of the disjunction of disjoint subprocesses is additive, thus the wave
concept of interference is generalized in a natural way to probabilistic phenomena by giving
the the role of the wave energy at the endpoint to the probability of the process : In a
probabilistic system, interference is the difference between the probability of the process
and the sum of the probabilities of the subprocesses. Based on this line of thought, we offer
the following definition of interference in probabilistic systems:
Definition. Given an event EP compatible with P for which, for all preparation states s,
Prs
(
EP
)
=
∑
t∈D
Prs
(
pt
)
, (10a)
the interference of EP with respect to {pj | j ∈ D} is
I(EP , {pj | j ∈ D}, s, q) = Prs
(
EP & q
)
−
∑
t∈D
Prs
(
pt& q
)
. (10b)
Thus (in the case D = { 1, 2 }) EP appears to be the disjunction p1 ∨ p2—but this “dis-
junction” doesn’t distribute: EP ∧ q 6≡ (p1 ∧ q) ∨ (p2 ∧ q). This phenomenon of quantum
interference (Q5 on the list of “quantal” properties) was described by Feynman(4) as the
“heart” of quantum mechanics, its “only mystery.”4 In quantum mechanics, interference
4 Feynman’s statement was made prior to Bell’s publications, hence the singularity of the mystery; but
nothing about Bell’s insights makes interference any less mysterious.
6 “Quantal” behavior in classical probability
arises exactly in the case that EP appears to be the disjunction p 1 ∨ p 2, but the appar-
ent alternatives p 1 and p 2 are physically indistinguishable (as in, for example, the atomic
double-slit apparatus) and the apparent disjunction fails to distribute.5
4. A CLASSICAL SYSTEM EXHIBITING THE PROPERTIES Q1–Q5
Here is an example of an entirely classical probabilistic system which illustrates the or-
dinary nature of much of “quantum probability”: incompatibility, the non-existence of
dispersion-free ensembles, the “failure” of the marginal-probability formula, and interfer-
ence.
In order to make this system dramatically non-quantal, I construct it using playing cards.
About these cards the reader need only know that each carries two marks, the “face” and
the “suit” (traditionally with names such as King, Queen, . . . , and Spades, Hearts, . . . ,
respectively), and that the suits are marked in two colors, red (Hearts and Diamonds) and
black (Spades and Clubs). I treat face, suit, and color as system variables; each variable is
“observed” (given a value) according to the rules of observation described below.
Interference may arise from a manifestation process which treats several values of a vari-
able identically, as in the case of a degenerate value in quantum mechanics. In this card
example, a natural choice for degeneracy is the color of the suit. The color of a card may
be observed in either of the following ways: We may observe the suit and report the color
(the failure to have a value for the suit is a matter of ignorance—which is what we mean by
“we ignored the suit”); in such a case, Eq. (10b) vanishes. Alternatively, we may observe
the color using a manifestation which processes the red suits identically, but differently from
the black suits; in our example this leads to interference (the nonvanishing of Eq. (10b)).
System S
A deck of playing cards, having two variables, Face and Suit, each of which may take on
a disjoint set of values: K, Q, J, and S, H, D, respectively. The variable Color (a function
of Suit) takes on the values R (red) and B (black). Duplicate cards are allowed, with
the restriction that each Face and each Suit appear in equal numbers (so their a priori
probabilities are equal).6 The variable under consideration (Face, Suit, or Color) is denoted
by P ; its values are { pj }.
Observation: To observe a variable P :
1. Shuffle the subdeck.
2. Report pj , the P -value of the subdeck’s top card.
3. Construct a new subdeck consisting of all cards for which P = pj .
E.g., to observe Face, shuffle the subdeck and report the Face-value of its top
card, Q, say, then construct a new subdeck consisting of all the Q’s in the deck.
To observe Color, shuffle the subdeck; if, say, the top card’s Suit-value is H (a
red card), report the Color R, then construct a new subdeck consisting of all the
deck’s R cards: all its H’s and all its D’s.
Preparation: To prepare the system in the state “the value of P is pj”:
repeat
1. Observe any other, incompatible, variable Q (ignoring the result).
2. Observe P .
until P = pj
5 This failure of distribution of disjunction is, of course, one basis for the introduction of “quantum logic.”
Another (related) reason is described in footnote 8.
6 For example, in the case of two-valued variables we might use the deck {KS,KS,KH,QS,QH,QH }: three
of each value.
“Quantal” behavior in classical probability 7
(This results in a subdeck consisting of all cards for which P = pj .)
The system S exemplifies incompatibility (Q1): The processes for observing Suit and Face
cannot be carried out simultaneously. For example, if the card on the top of the subdeck is
QH, then the reporting of Face would require the construction of a new subdeck consisting
of all the Q’s, while the reporting of Suit would require the construction of a new subdeck
consisting of all the H’s. It is impossible to carry out these two constructions simultaneously
(unless the deck contains no H’s and no Q’s other than the QH).7
The statistical behavior of S is summarized in Eq. (11), in which I use the following
notation: P , Q, X , and Y are system variables; P and Q are different variables, with
possible values { pj } and { qk }, respectively, while x and y are (not necessarily distinct)
values of the (not necessarily different) variables X and Y . (In the example, the variables
are Face or Suit, their values are K, Q,. . . , S, H,. . . .) The equalities in Eq. (11) hold for all
value indices; the inequalities hold for at least some values. The system is prepared in the
state s.
Prs[0]
(
p
[2]
k
∣∣ p[1]j ) = δjk (repeatability); (11a)
Prs
(
qk
∣∣ pj ) = Prs( pj ∣∣ qk ) (reciprocity); (11b)
Prs
(
x& y
)
= Prx
(
y
)
Prs
(
x
)
(Markovian); (11c)
Prs
(
pk& pl
)
= Prs
(
pl& pk
)
(self-compatibility); (11d)
Prs
(
pk& ql
)
6= Prs
(
ql ∧ pk
)
(incompatibility); (11e)
Prs
(
qk
∣∣ pj ) 6= 1 (if P is sharp, Q is not); (11f)
(∃ j ∋ Prs
(
pj
)
/∈ { 0, 1 }) =⇒ (marginal probability∑
tPrs
(
pt& qk
)
6= Prs
(
qk
)
formula “fails”); (11g)
(α) Prs
(
R
)
= Prs
(
H ∨ D
)
∀ s, but (the interference of R
(β) Prs
(
R& qk
)
6= Prs
( (
H ∨D
)
& qk
)
relative to H ∨D). (11h)
(These results are derived in Appendix B for any number of variables with any number of
values.)
From Eq. (11a) we see that, following the observation of, say, Face, the ensemble is sharp
in Face: the observation is repeatable. In quantum mechanics, Eqs. (11b) and (11c) hold for
nondegenerate values. (Eq. (11c) may be written equivalently as
Prs
(
y
∣∣ x ) =
{
Prx
(
y
)
, if Prs
(
x
)
6= 0
undefined otherwise;
(11c′)
filtering a manifestation to a specific result erases any “memory” of the earlier preparation
state.)
Eq. (11d) shows that, as in quantum mechanics, the variables of this system are compatible
with themselves. Eqs. (11e)–(11h) are the archetypal “quantal” effects Q2–Q5 .
Tables I–IV illustrate results for a simple version of the system, involving just two vari-
ables, each with three values. Table III shows an apparent failure of completeness, and
Table IV shows an apparent failure of the distributive rule; we discuss these “failures” in
the succeeding section.
The system S exhibits the phenomena Q1–Q5 as a result of the laws of probability and an
“intelligent” choice of selection rules and cards—it does not simulate them (in the sense that
a system constructed using Newtonian mechanics and an “intelligent” choice of parameters
7 Of course, one might cheat and look at both values as marked on the card; however, it is impossible
to follow both subdeck-construction rules, and thus the cheat would be meaningless, irrelevant to the
behavior of the system—as irrelevant as, say, having just determined the z-component of spin, flipping a
coin to “determine” the x-component.
8 “Quantal” behavior in classical probability
S H D
K 0.1 0.4 0.5
Q 0.4 0.5 0.1
J 0.5 0.1 0.4
Pr
(
Suit
[1]
k
∣∣ Face[0]j )= Pr(Face[1]j ∣∣ Suit[0]k )
TABLE I: The basic probabilities; note that there are no dispersion-free states (Q3). (Multiplying
each table entry by (a multiple of) 10 gives the number of duplicates of that card.)
and initial conditions exhibits the orbital phenomena of the solar system; an orrery, or a
combination of observational data and Kepler’s Laws, simulates those phenomena). Further,
S does not approximate the specific quantitative results of quantum mechanics (which,
of course, also satisfies Q2–Q5 ); S is neither a model nor a mechanization of quantum
mechanics.
5. MANIFESTATION
5.1. Apparent problems with completeness
A naive consideration of the completeness of the values of a variable would suggest that,
since {K,Q, J } exhausts the possibilities of Face (in the decks being considered in S), it
must be that K ∨ Q ∨ J = T. Similarly, it must be that S ∨ H ∨ D = T. And this is correct
in many ways; for example, Prx
(
K ∨ Q ∨ J
)
= Prx
(
K
)
+ Prx
(
Q
)
+ Prx
(
J
)
= 1 for any
preparation x. However, note that
PrQ
( (
K ∨ Q ∨ J
)
&K
)
= 0, (12a)
but
PrQ
( (
S ∨ H ∨ D
)
&K
)
= PrQ
(
S&K
)
+ PrQ
(
H&K
)
+ PrQ
(
D&K
)
= PrS
(
K
)
PrQ
(
S
)
+ PrH
(
K
)
PrQ
(
H
)
+ PrD
(
K
)
PrQ
(
D
)
≥ 0 (12b)
(using Eqs. (11a)–(11c)). This can vanish only in a specially selected deck such that the K’s
and the Q’s share no suit—not the general case. But these expressions would necessarily be
equal were both K ∨ Q ∨ J and S ∨ H ∨ D equal to T.
Thus K ∨ Q ∨ J and S ∨ H ∨ D cannot both be true (hence equal) at the same time. But
if K ∨ Q ∨ J 6= T it must be that Face has no value at all. This is exactly the case in our
cardgame example: The observations of Face and Suit are incompatible processes, hence
Face and Suit cannot have values simultaneously.8
8 The erroneous identification of the two probability-1 disjunctions
∨
j pj and
∨
k qk (of incompatible vari-
ables P and Q respectively) has mislead us to quantum logic by suggesting that we “patch together” the
Boolean proposition lattices of P and Q into a non-modular lattice, by identifying their least elements
and identifying their greatest elements.
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S H D
K 0.09 0.36 0.45
Q -0.16 -0.20 -0.04
J -0.25 -0.05 -0.20
Pr
(
Face
[1]
k ∧ Suit
[2]
l
∣∣ K )− Pr( Suit[1]l ∧ Face[2]k ∣∣ K )
TABLE II: Incompatibility (Q2). Note that the two variables are incompatible in every value, and
that the incompatibilities are not symmetric.
5.2. Manifestation
But if a variable does not always have a value, there must be a process which causes a
variable P to take on one of its values; I call that process the manifestation of P and denote
itMP . Each event in this probability system of variable values must be a manifestation. The
probability Prx
(
S&K
)
, for example, has meaning only in the context of the manifestation
history MSuit &MFace as the condition of the probability: Prx
(
S&K
∣∣MSuit&MFace ).
With the understanding that this manifestation history is a necessary part of the prob-
ability expression, it is often safe to leave it implicit—but not always: If we make the
manifestations in Eq. (12) explicit, we may safely identify the disjunctions as true; for
example, we may write Eq. (12b) as
PrQ
( (
S ∨ H ∨ D
)
&K
∣∣MSuit &MFace ) = PrQ(T&K ∣∣MSuit&MFace ). (13)
The M
[2]
Face
may be made implicit (“dropped”) without harm, but PrQ[0]
(
K
[2]
)
would be
ambiguous regarding the occurrence at [1], so the M
[1]
Suit
(and M
[1]
Face
, in Eq. (12a)) must be
left explicit. Thus, we may write Eqs. (12a) and (12b) as
PrQ
(
K
∣∣MFace ) = 0 (14a)
PrQ
(
K
∣∣MSuit ) ≥ 0; (14b)
that these may differ is no surprise.
5.3. Congruence with the manifestation history
Let us generalize this. Accounting for the manifestation history and the disjointness of
{ pj }, ∑
t
Prs
(
pt& q
)
= Prs
( (∨
t
pt
)
& q
∣∣MP &MQ ). (15)
Conditionalize the right side probability on the disjunction
∨
t pt (whose probability is 1),
and note that, while M
[2]
Q may be made implicit without ambiguity, the manifestation M
[1]
P
must be denoted explicitly, thereby obtaining the correct form of the marginal-probability
formula for sequences involving incompatible variables:∑
t
Prs
(
pt& q
)
= Prs
(
q
∣∣MP ). (16)
The right side expresses Q4 explicitly: Though we have ignored the value of an observed
variable, we may not ignore the fact of that variable’s observation.
This discussion leads to the rule
10 “Quantal” behavior in classical probability
K
[1,2]
Q
[1,2]
J
[1,2]
K
[0] -0.90 0.40 0.50
Q
[0] 0.40 -0.50 0.10
J
[0] 0.50 0.10 -0.60
Pr
( (
S ∨ H ∨ D
)[1]
∧ Face
[2]
k
∣∣ Face[0]j ) − Pr(Face[1]k ∣∣ Face[0]j )
TABLE III: The effect of ignoring a prior observation of Suit—an apparent failure of the marginal-
probability formula (Q4).
The probability of an event-sequence necessarily includes the manifestation his-
tory in the condition of the probability expression (and the event-sequence must
be congruent with that manifestation history).9
The simultaneous manifestation M
[1]
Face
∧M
[1]
Suit
is impossible (as already pointed out, in
Sec. 4). An impossible condition leads to an undefined conditional probability (cf. Eq. (A2));
thus Prx
(
K ∧ S
)
≡ Prx
(
K
[1] ∧ S[1]
∣∣ M [1]
Face
∧M
[1]
Suit
)
is undefined—disallowed logically, not
by decree. Generally,
The simultaneous manifestation of the values of several incompatible variables is
impossible, hence the probability of the simultaneous conjunction (or disjunction)
of their values is meaningless—their joint probability distribution does not exist.
5.4. Significance of manifestation
In a probabilistic system, events are physical processes, interactions with the exterior
of the system; the nature of the event, in particular the identity of the variable which is
randomly affected (“takes on a value”) in an event, depends on the details of the physical in-
teraction. We have expressed this as manifestation, a necessary component of any discussion
of processes in physically realistic probabilistic systems (quantal or other). Manifestation
is (due to) the physical interaction of the system under consideration with its exterior; in
the absence of such interaction, there is no event, no probabilistic branching. Manifesta-
tion implements Bohr’s dictum that the entire situation must be taken into account; while
Bohr’s requirement is (merely) metaphysical, the requirement that manifestation be taken
into account is a logical consequence of this analysis.
Both quantum mechanics and the theory describing S are probability theories of sequences
of events, not of the events themselves. These sequences’ probabilities are defined in terms
of a classical Boolean probability space whose elements are the sequences congruent with
a given manifestation history. When we carry out all analysis in terms of the sequence-
element, no anomalies arise. It may appear that these probabilities fail the Kolmogorov
postulates if we forget their contextuality: that congruence. Taking into account the phys-
ical situation—the manifestation history—properly restricts the choice of the sequence of
events, guaranteeing a Boolean probability space. As we see in these ordinary systems, this
contextuality is a respectable, non-subjective property of a probabilistic system with more
than one variable.
It is common in probability applications to ignore (“sum out”) the outcome of an event;
we’ve seen, however, that in general we may not ignore the fact that an outcome was ig-
nored—we must take into account the fact of the manifestation of the ignored variable to
9 The event-sequences congruent with a given manifestation history form a Boolean event space.
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K
[2]
Q
[2]
J
[2]
K
[0] -0.005 0.020 -0.015
Q
[0] 0.020 -0.080 0.060
J
[0] -0.015 0.060 -0.045
Pr
(
R[1] ∧ Face
[2]
k
∣∣ Face[0]j )− Pr( (H ∨ D)[1] ∧ Face[2]k ∣∣ Face[0]j )
TABLE IV: Numerical results demonstrating interference (Q5)—the apparent failure of the dis-
tributive rule (p ∨ q) ∧ r = (p ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ r).
avoid numerous anomalies, such as the apparent failure of the formula for marginal prob-
ability, the appearance of non-Boolean probability structures, and difficulties such as the
“Curious” results of Ref. 5 (which I discuss in Ref. 6).
5.5. Margenau, marginal probabilities, and manifestation
For a quantum mechanical system prepared in the state Ψ, we have
PrΨ
(
qk
)
= |〈qk |Ψ〉|
2
. (17a)
But also, for the non-degenerate values { pj } (whose occurrence, in quantum mechanics, is
Markovian: PrΨ
(
qk
∣∣ pj ) = Prpj ( qk )), we have∑
t
PrΨ
(
pt& qk
)
=
∑
t
PrΨ
(
qk
∣∣ pt )PrΨ( pt ) =∑
t
|〈qk | pt〉|
2 |〈pt |Ψ〉|
2 . (17b)
According to the conventionally accepted formula for marginal probability (Eq. (A3)),
these should be equal; however, as Margenau(2) pointed out, they are not:∑
t
|〈qk | pt〉|
2 |〈pt |Ψ〉|
2 6= |〈qk |Ψ〉|
2 . (18)
Margenau interpreted this as establishing the failure of classical probability within quantum
mechanics.
However, as exemplified in Sec. 4, this “failure” occurs in ordinary probability settings.
The marginal-probability formula for sequences of events is correctly given by Eq. (16);
Eq. (17b) is to be equated, not with Eq. (17a), but with PrΨ
(
qk
∣∣MP ). Now (cf. Eq. (3))
PrΨ
(
qk
∣∣MP ) = PrΨ&MP ( qk ) = Tr{ρP (Ψ) | qk 〉〈 qk |}, (19)
with ρP (Ψ), the p-state after preparation in Ψ followed by manifestation of P , given by
ρP (Ψ) =
∑
t
| pt 〉〈 pt | |Ψ 〉〈Ψ | | pt 〉〈 pt |; (20)
thus
PrΨ
(
qk
∣∣MP ) =∑
t
|〈qk | pt〉|
2 |〈pt |Ψ〉|
2 , (21)
in accordance with the correct marginal-probability formula Eq. (16). No failure of clas-
sical probability within quantum mechanics arises here—only a failure to apply classical
probability correctly.
12 “Quantal” behavior in classical probability
6. INDETERMINATE VALUES
There is a further property which has played a major role in the interpretation of quantum
mechanics—that of the “nonreality” of quantum systems, the value-indeterminate nature of
variables:
Q6. The variables are value-indeterminate, having no value except as one arises upon
observation.
Value-indeterminacy is suggested by Q1–Q3—Bohr included it in his metaphysical prin-
ciple of complementarity. In quantum mechanics, it is suggested even more strongly by
results arising directly out of the formalism.(7,8) Although quite disturbing to classically-
trained physicists with a bias toward determinism (that is, all of us), it is not in fact
particularly strange—merely by making the system S of Sec. 4 truly nondeterministic, we
obtain a real system (Svi, below) which is seen by internal analysis to be nonrealistic (value-
indeterminate).
First, some definitions:
Definition Value-Determinate System. At every instant there exists, for each variable of
the system, a value which would be the result were that variable to be the next observed.
(This does not require that, at such instant, the variable physically have the value that it
will, if observed, display.)
Definition Deterministic System. The outcome of a future event is a function of the values
of the variables of the system at an earlier time. (This is future-determinism, all we need
for the following development.)
In a deterministic system the outcome of the next observation of a variable is determined
by the present state, so the result of that future observation has a value now: A deterministic
system is necessarily value-determinate.
6.1. Examples of value-determinacy and -indeterminacy
In the system S, introduced and discussed in Sec. 4, the shuffling of the deck was taken
to be deterministic (e.g., mechanical); in that case, the outcome of the next pick exists
now—the variables are value-determinate. However, this determinism is not necessary—the
choice of the next card may be made nondeterministically, and this may lead to value-
indeterminacy. To implement this nondeterministic choice we may use any of a number
of physical systems with random behavior—nuclear decay, Josephson junction tunneling,
photons impinging on a beam splitter—to generate truly nondeterministic random numbers
to pick the cards. Thus, consider Svi:
System Svi
The system Svi is exactly as S except that the deck is shuffled nondeterministically.
The statistics of Svi and of S are identical, satisfying all of Eq. (11). Svi is perfectly
real (and easily constructed),10 but it is not “realistic”—it is clearly a value-indeterminate
system: if the most recently observed variable were, say, Face, then whatever value would
appear if Suit were to be observed in a moment does not exist before that process of obser-
vation, and will only be brought into existence by the nondeterministic shuffling of the deck
at the time of observation.
The value-indeterminacy of Svi arises strictly from its nondeterministic card choice; the
systems S and Svi are otherwise identical. However, nondeterminism does not, in and of
itself, imply value-indeterminacy, as we see in Svd:
10 Svi is not “classical”; classical physics is the study of a strictly deterministic world. Neither, however,
does the presence of a Josephson junction, say, make Svi “quantal”; no aspect of the theory of quantum
mechanics need be used in its analysis.
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System Svd
The system Svd is a modification of S, in which the manifestation rule is carried out in the
order 2, 3, 1 (i.e., shuffle last).
E.g., observing Face following the prior observation of Suit = H, the subdeck consists
of all the H’s. Report the Face-value of its top card, Q, say; create a new subdeck
consisting of all the Q’s, then shuffle it.
Svd is value-determinate (whether the shuffling is deterministic or nondeterministic): both
Face and Suit have values (those of the top card) prior to an observation of either—although
only one can be observed, the other being disturbed by that observation. (The statistical
properties of Svd, including interference, are identical with S and Svi.)
6.2. Discussion: Value indeterminacy in quantum mechanics
These examples show us that “nonrealism” is a straightforward possibility in nondeter-
ministic systems. However, in contrast with Q2–Q5 , which are statistical, that is, phe-
nomenological, value-indeterminacy is an ontic property with no characteristic empirical
consequence. It can be demonstrated only by analysis of the workings of the system: S
and Svi have identical observable behavior, but one is value-determinate, the other value-
indeterminate. Furthermore, while nondeterminism is necessary for value indeterminacy, as
we have seen from the example of Svd it is not sufficient.
We should note here that interference depends neither on value-indeterminacy nor on
nondeterminism: it occurs in the value-determinate Svd as well as in the value-indeterminate
Svi, both nondeterministic, as well as in the deterministic and value-determinate S.
The problem of indeterminate values—the lack of “reality” of the values of variables—has
been a central difficulty for the interpretation of quantum mechanics: Ref. 9, for example,
concludes with “In this book we have been mainly concerned with the difficulties encountered
by a simple-minded realism of possessed values”; because of indeterminacy, Ref. 10 considers
reality to be “veiled”; the consistent-histories interpretation and the various modal interpre-
tations all have as their central purpose the avoidance of value-indeterminate variables, while
Copenhagenism goes to the other extreme, metaphysically demanding value-indeterminacy
under the philosophical principle of complementarity.
However, in the ordinary, non-quantal system Svi, the values are indeterminate—the
mechanism of this system makes it clear that a newly manifested variable had no value
prior to its manifestation. Value-indeterminacy is a normal possibility in a nondeterministic
system (at a certain point in the manifestation process, a nondeterministic choice brings one
variable’s value into existence, and, at the same moment, pushes the other variable’s value
out of existence).11 Thus, value indeterminacy has no “explanation” beyond the the ontic
fact of nondeterminism: though we have complete understanding of their internal structure
and behavior, we gain no explanation of the nonrealism of our classical examples beyond
the analysis which demonstrates it.
We may caricature as the view of Heisenberg and of Bohr, respectively, that the incom-
patibility of variables is epistemic (it is merely that we have no technique, even, perhaps, in
principle, to observe at one instant the values of incompatible variables) or ontic (it is that
they have no such values). Each of these alternatives is, in fact, quite possible, as S and Svi
illustrate. Epistemic and ontic incompatibility are not other than the value-determinacy or
-indeterminacy of the incompatible variables.
The mystery of the indeterminate values of quantum mechanics is not to be resolved
through (unattainable) detailed knowledge of the system, nor by deep metaphysics; it is not
other than the mystery of nondeterminism.
11 The classic example of indeterminate value is due to Aristotle: B = “There will be a sea-battle tomorrow.”
Then B ∨ ∼B is true, but, assuming nondeterminism in human affairs, neither B nor ∼B has a truth
value today.
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7. CONCLUSION
Each of the phenomena Q1–Q6 has been considered, by one author or another, to be char-
acteristic of quantum mechanics, inexplicable and unacceptable from the viewpoint of classi-
cal physics. The problematic nature of these apparently quantal properties—incompatibility,
the non-existence of dispersion-free pure states, interference, value-indeterminacy—seems to
call for the “interpretation” of quantum mechanics—but, unfortunately, not in any single
interpretational direction: The problems raised by Q1–Q3 encouraged Bohr’s complemen-
tarity principle and “Copenhagenism”; the failure of the distributive rule of logic (Q4 and
Q5) has given rise to various quantum probabilities and logics. The various modal and
consistent-histories interpretations arose primarily in order to solve the “problem” of quan-
tal “nonrealism,” Q6.12
There are, of course, interpretive difficulties with quantum mechanics other than those
associated with Q1–Q6: The issues of “collapse” and the Measurement Problem (alias
“Schro¨dinger’s Cat”), which have generated the decoherence approach; and the impossi-
bility, established by Bell, of reducing quantum mechanics (specifically, its distant correla-
tions) to classical-mechanical kinetic theory (which includes, of course, any scheme based
on systems of the sort presented in this paper). I have not dealt with any of these issues in
this paper.13
But the phenomena Q2–Q5 are, from a probability viewpoint, quite unexceptional, even
expected, and certainly comprehensible: they have all been exemplified in an ordinary
(“classical”) probabilistic system S. The appearance of Q2–Q5 in this emphatically non-
quantal system establishes decisively that none of these phenomena are quantal.
Both quantum mechanics and S (absolutely distinct from quantum mechanics) are exam-
ples of probabilistic systems having more than one variable; because Q2–Q5 appear in both,
we must conclude that these phenomena are characteristic of (some subset of) probabilistic
systems of several variables, but are characteristic neither of S nor of quantum mechanics.14
Nor are these phenomena in any way quantal weirdness: any metaphysical problems these
phenomena may present are problems for the entirety of their subset of theories, and require
no special interpretations of quantum mechanics for the understanding of their implications
(although their appearance in this card game example rather removes the sense there might
be “implications” needing “understanding”).
No explanation of the appearance of Q2–Q5 in quantum mechanics is necessary beyond
noting that quantum mechanics is a probabilistic system which has more than one variable.
It may be that analysis of the workings of a system exhibiting Q2–Q5 will shed light on the
particulars of the mechanism by which they are expressed (though, in quantum mechanics,
seventy-five years of trying have yielded no such prize). That, in fact, not much such light
can or need be shed is supported by the theorem of Sec. 3.1: Given the Hilbert-space
formalism of quantum mechanics, statistical incompatibility of variables requires neither
more nor less than the noncommutativity of the variables’ operators: there is no room
for further explanation (in the sense that, as mechanical conservation laws are sufficient
to explain the center-of-mass motion of colliding billiard balls, no room is left for further
explanation of that center-of-mass motion though study of the internal elastic response
12 This oversimplification of the development of these interpretive systems is not, I think, misleading in the
present context.
13 However, I might comment that the first of these is greatly clarified by recalling that a the state concept in
a probabilistic system is categorically different from that of a deterministic system; the second and third
are similarly greatly clarified by the recognition that a probabilistic system, which quantum mechanics
certainly is, may well be (though there is no phenomenological test) irreducibly probabilistic, that is,
nondeterministic, hence its variables may well be value-indeterminate (Q6)—in which case the usual
derivations of the Bell conditions fail, and the positivity requirement in Fine’s derivation(11) loses cogency.
14 Socrates’ mortality is characteristic, not of Socrates, but of a subset of all beings, the mortal beings, of
which he is a member. Although a study of the details of Socrates’ mortality may bear fruit (or hemlock),
questions regarding the meaning of his mortality—its “interpretation”—must be directed at, and studied
within the context of, mortal beings.
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during the collision.)
Q1 is not a phenomenon, but an ontic property; its empirical results arise probabilistically
in Q2–Q5 . Q1 is seen to be true for the classical system presented here by analysis of that
system; it is suspected to be true of quantum mechanics from numerous analyses of the
experimental conditions necessary to manifest distinct variables, all of which support this
suspicion. (Q1 could be shown to be true of quantum mechanics only through an analysis of
its internal workings, but (as far as we know or believe) quantum mechanics has no internal
workings.)
Value-indeterminacy (Q6), the “non-reality” of variables, is (obviously) the norm for the
variables of a nondeterministic system: their values leap into existence at each event. In the
case of several variables, it is repeatability (per von Neumann)—the value-determinacy of an
already-observed variable—which makes the value-indeterminacy of the other variables seem
“wrong.” Non-reality of this kind is a problem only given a belief in an underlying determin-
ism for quantum mechanics. Whatever metaphysical difficulties Q1–Q6—incompatibility,
nondeterminism and nonrealism—may bring, such difficulties are not particular to quantum
mechanics, nor do they call for heroic efforts of quantum interpretation; to the extent that
an interpretation of quantum mechanics is based on these properties, it is irrelevant.
APPENDIX A: ELEMENTARY PROBABILITY OF PROPOSITIONS
Each event of a probabilistic system is characterized by the set of propositions which take
on truth values; there can be no presumption that all propositions regarding the system
need take on a truth value at each event.15 For all propositions which do take on truth
values in a given event we have the following:16
Pr
(
F
)
= 0 ≤ Pr
(
a
)
≤ 1 = Pr
(
T
)
(A1a)
Pr
(
a ∨ b
)
+ Pr
(
a ∧ b
)
= Pr
(
a
)
+ Pr
(
b
)
, (A1b)
with F and T the absurd and trivial propositions, respectively; hence
Pr
(
∼a
)
= 1− Pr
(
a
)
. (A1c)
The set { aj } is disjoint iff, whenever all { aj } take on values, aj ∧ aj′ = F, j 6= j
′;
a disjoint set satisfies
∑
t Prs
(
at
)
= Prs
(∨
t at
)
for all preparations s. The set { aj } is
complete iff, whenever all { aj } take on values,
∨
t at = T; hence, a disjoint, complete set
satisfies
∑
t Prs
(
at
)
= 1 for all preparations s.
The conditional probability (probability conditioned on an occurrent fact), defined by
Pr
(
b
∣∣ a ) =
{
Pr
(
a ∧ b
)
/Pr
(
a
)
Pr
(
a
)
> 0
undefined otherwise,
(A2)
is the probability of the truth of the proposition b given that the fact stated by the propo-
sition a occurs. Examples of the condition a would be “the coin was flipped,” “the Jokers
were removed from the deck,” “the first card was a King”; equally well (though not seen in
this paper), the condition may be yet to occur: “the probability of drawing a King given
that the card drawn after it is a Spade.” The condition is an occurrent fact—the only place,
in a probabilistic theory, where “what actually happens” can appear.
15 One might draw a card from a deck, or one might throw the deck into the air; the proposition p =
“A card landed on the chair” is true or false in the second event, but has neither meaning nor truth value
in the first event.
16 Disjunction (“or”) is indicated by ∨; conjunction (“and”), by ∧; negation (“not”) by ∼.
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Given the disjoint and complete set { pj } and an arbitrary value q, what can be said of∑
t Prs
(
pt ∧ q
)
? Because { pj } is disjoint, { pj ∧ q } is disjoint; hence
∑
t Prs
(
pt ∧ q
)
=
Prs
(
(
∨
t pt) ∧ q
)
. Since the set { pj } is complete,
∨
t pt = T, thus∑
t
Prs
(
pt ∧ q
)
= Prs
(
q
)
, (A3)
the formula of marginal probability. (The use of the term “marginal” refers to row- and
column-sums in the margins of a table of probabilities of pj ∧ qk.)
APPENDIX B: THE SYSTEM OF SEC. 4
System: a deck of cards marked with three17 “variables,” P , Q, and R (think of Face,
Suit, and, say, Letter), each taking on V values denoted respectively pk, ql, and rm. The
specific card denoted (pk · ql · rm) appears N(pk · ql · rm) times in the deck. We have
(in all permutations) N(pk · ql) =
∑
mN(pk · ql · rm) and N(pk) =
∑
lmN(pk · ql · rm).
The restriction that each value of each variable has equal a priori probability requires
N(pk) = N(ql) = N(rm) ≡ N ; the total number of cards in the deck is then NV , and the
fractional occurrence of each card in the deck is
f(pk · ql · rm) =
nklm
V
, (B1)
where
nklm ≡
N(pk · ql · rm)
N
. (B2)
Note that all double sums of nklm equal 1, and all triple sums equal V .
1. Analysis of the system
According to the rules of system S (and systems Svi and Svd, as well), the probability of
the occurrence of the specific card (pk · ql · rm) at the top of the subdeck, the system having
been prepared in x and the value P = pj (or Q = qk) having been observed, is
Prx
(
(pk · ql · rm)
∣∣ pj ) = δkj njlm (B3a)
Prx
(
(pk · ql · rm)
∣∣ qj ) = δlj nkjm. (B3b)
Summing Eqs. (B3) over l and m, we have
Prx
(
pk
∣∣ pj ) = δkj (B4a)
Prx
(
pk
∣∣ qj ) = N(pk · qj)
N
. (B4b)
Eq. (B4b) establishes
Prx
(
pk
∣∣ qj ) = Prx( qj ∣∣ pk ). (B5)
Prx
(
y
∣∣ pk ) does not depend on the preparation state x (assuming Prx( pk ) 6= 0)—that
is, the system’s probabilities are Markovian:
Prx
(
pk & y
)
= Pr
(
y
∣∣ pk )Prx( pk ). (B6)
17 The generalization to more than three variables is obvious, and has no effect on the results, Eqs. (B4),
(B6), (B9), and (B11).
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Henceforth in this Appendix we drop the preparation-state subscript from conditional prob-
abilities.
Consider the “marginal probability” summation (where neither of the variables X or Y
is the variable P ):
∑
t
Prx
(
pt& y
)
=
∑
t
Pr
(
y
∣∣ pt )Prx( pt ) = 1
N2
∑
t
N(pt · x)N(pt · y). (B7)
However, Pr
(
y
∣∣ x ) is 0 or 1, if x and y are values of the same variable, or N(x·y)/N , if they
are values of distinct variablesX , Y . It is obvious, in the former case, that
∑
t Prx
(
pt& y
)
6=
Prx
(
y
)
; numerical examples easily establish the occurrence of this inequality in the latter
case.
2. Analysis of the system—interference
Introduce the additional variable Π with values { pij }. Π is a function of the variable P ,
Π = f(P ); the function is defined by f(p1) = pi1, f(p2) = pi1, f(pj) = pij−1, j > 2. Then
N(pi1 · qk · rl) = N(p1 · qk · rl)+N(p2 · qk · rl) = 2N , and N(pij · qk · rl) = N(pj+1 · qk · rl) = N
for j > 1. The rule for the observation of a variable is unchanged. (In the example of Sec. 4,
P is Suit, p1 is H, p2 is D, p3 is S, Π is Color, pi1 is R and pi2 is B.)
The probability of the occurrence of a specific card at the top of the subdeck, the system
having been prepared in x and the value P = pj , Q = qk, or Π = pi1 having been observed,
is
Pr
(
(pi1 · ql · rm)
∣∣ pj ) = (δ1j + δ2j)njlm (B8a)
Pr
(
(pi1 · ql · rm)
∣∣ qj ) = δlj (n1lm + n2lm) (B8b)
Pr
(
(pj · ql · rm)
∣∣ pi1 ) = (δj1 n1lm + δj2 n2lm)/2 (B8c)
Summing Eqs. (B8a) and (B8c) over l and m, we find
Pr
(
pi1
∣∣ pj ) = Pr( p1 ∣∣ pj )+ Pr( p2 ∣∣ pj ) = 2Pr( pj ∣∣ pi1 ); (B9a)
summing Eq. (B8b) over l and m, and in Eq. (B8c) exchanging j and l and then summing
over l and m, we find
Pr
(
pi1
∣∣ qj ) = Pr( p1 ∣∣ qj )+ Pr( p2 ∣∣ qj ) = 2Pr( qj ∣∣ pi1 ). (B9b)
In the definition of interference, Eq. (10), we take EP = Π1. Then Eqs. (B9) show that
Eq. (10a) is satisfied, and Eq. (10b), the interference, becomes
Pr
(
pi1& y
∣∣ x )− Pr( (p1 ∨ p2)& y ∣∣ x ). (B10)
Because pi1 completely specifies the p-state, Eq. (B6) generalizes to
Pr
(
pi1& y
∣∣ x ) = Pr( y ∣∣ pi1 )Pr(pi1 ∣∣ x ) = 2∑
s,t=1
Pr
(
y
∣∣ ps )Pr( pt ∣∣ x )
(using Eq. (B9)). Thus the interference is given by
−Pr
(
y
∣∣ p1 )Pr( p2 ∣∣ x )− Pr( y ∣∣ p2 )Pr( p1 ∣∣ x ), (B11)
which does not vanish in general. (This classical interference arises from the off-diagonal
terms of a sum, exactly as in the corresponding quantum-mechanical expression.)
18 “Quantal” behavior in classical probability
APPENDIX C: EXERCISES
These back-of-the-envelope exercises introduce the reader to some of the principles in-
volved in several-variable stochastic systems.
Given a deck of cards, we may choose to observe the value of either Face or Suit; the
rule for doing so is
1. Draw a card.
2a. To observe Face: report the card’s Face value; if Face = K, return the card to
the deck, otherwise discard it.
2b. To observe Suit: report the card’s Suit value; if Suit = H, return the card to the
deck, otherwise discard it.
The deck is {KS, QH }; hence {K, Q } is a complete set of values of Face, and {S, H }
is a complete set of values of Suit.
Exercise 1. (Q1) Show that it is not always possible to observe both Face and Suit simul-
taneously. (Hint: suppose the card drawn is KS.)
Exercise 2. (Q2) Show that observations of Suit and Face do not commute temporally; for
example, show that Pr
(
K
[1] ∧ S[2]
)
= 1/4, while Pr
(
S
[1] ∧ K[2]
)
= 0. What does this imply
regarding the existence of joint distributions (such as Pr
(
S ∧ K
)
)?
Exercise 3. (Q4) Show that Eq. (8) gives an ambiguous value for Pr
(
K
[2]
)
, by showing that
Pr
( (
K ∨ Q
)[1]
∧ K[2]
)
= 3/4, while Pr
( (
S ∨ H
)[1]
∧ K[2]
)
= 0. How can this be reconciled
with the apparent fact that K ∨ Q = S ∨ H = T?
(No exercise regarding Q3 is possible: because observations on this system do not repeat,
“sharpness” has no meaning.)
1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Wiley, New York, 1974.
2. H. Margenau, “Measurements in quantum mechanics,” Ann. Phys. 23, 469–485 (1963).
3. J. E. G. Farina, “An elementary approach to quantum probability,” Am. J. Phys. 61(5), 466–
468 (1993).
4. R. P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, and M. Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Vol. III,
Addison-Wesley, 1965.
5. D. Z. Albert, Y. Aharonov, and S. D’Amato, “Curious new statistical prediction of quantum
mechanics,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 54(1), 5–7 (1985).
6. K. A. Kirkpatrick, “Classical Three-Box ‘paradox’,” J. Phys. A, quant-ph/0207124.
7. J. S. Bell, “On the problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 38(3),
447–452 (1966).
8. S. Kochen and E. P. Specker, “The problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics,” J.
Math. Mech. 17(1), 59–87 (1967).
9. M. Redhead, Incompleteness, Nonlocality, and Realism, Clarendon Paperbacks, Oxford, 1989.
10. B. d’Espagnat, Veiled Reality, Addison-Wesley, 1995.
11. A. Fine, “Joint distributions, quantum correlations, and commuting observables,” J. Math.
Phys. 23(7), 1306–1310 (1982).
